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PENNSYLVANIA VEHICLE CODE-THE PENNSYLVANIA IMPLIED CON-
SENT PROVISION-RIGHT To REFUSE CHEMICAL TESTING TO DETER-
MINE AMOUNT OF ALCOHOL OR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that an individual charged
with driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled sub-
stances, and/or with driving with a blood alcohol level in excess of
.10%, has a statutory right to refuse chemical testing of the blood
for the presence of alcohol or controlled substances and that test
results obtained in contravention of the right to refuse are inad-
missible into evidence at trial on the charges.
Commonwealth v Eisenhart, Pa , 611 A2d 681 (1992).
In Commonwealth v Eisenhart,' the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court ruled that the Implied Consent provision2 of the Pennsylva-
nia Vehicle Code' enabled an individual charged with driving
under the influence of alcohol 4 (DUI) and driving with a blood al-
cohol level in excess of .10%' to refuse to submit to a chemical test
1. Pa , 611 A2d 681 (1992).
2. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547 (a) (Purdon Supp 1992). This statute provides:
Chemical testing to determine amount of alcohol or controlled substance:
(a) General rule. - Any person who drives, operates or is in actual physical control of
the movement of a motor vehicle in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to have
given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath, blood or urine for the purpose
of determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a controlled sub-
stance if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been
driving, operating or in actual physical control of the movement of a motor vehicle:
(1) while Under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance or both; or
(2) which was involved in an accident in which the operator or passenger of
any vehicle involved or a pedestrian required treatment at a medical facility or
was killed.
75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547(a).
3. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 101 et seq (Purdon 1977 & Supp 1992).
4. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a)(1) (Purdon Supp 1992). This statute provides:
Driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance:
(a) Offense defined. - A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control
of the movement of any vehicle while:
(1) under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapa-
ble of safe driving; ...
75 Pa Cons Stat Ann §3731(a)(1).
5. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a)(4) (Purdon Supp 1992). This statute provides:
Driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance:
(a) Offense Defined - A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control
of the movement of any vehicle while: ...
(4) the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the person is 0.10% or
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of the blood and that test results obtained in contravention of the
right to refuse are inadmissible into evidence of the charges.,
On April 24, 1987, William Eisenhart (Eisenhart) impacted a
wall of a private residence with his motor vehicle. Upon arrival of
the police, Eisenhart appeared dazed and dizzy, his pupils were di-
lated, and he moved in an unsteady manner.8 The police officer at
the scene observed a case of beer on the seat of Eisenhart's vehicle
and an open can of beer spilling on the floor of the driver's com-
partment.9 Eisenhart supplied a Social Security Card in response
to a request for his driver's license.'0 Eisenhart then failed two po-
lice administered field sobriety tests,11 was placed under arrest,
and requested to take a blood test.'2 Eisenhart consented to, then
refused the blood test; thereafter, the police officer transported
Eisenhart to the hospital.'"
At the hospital, Eisenhart again refused to submit to a blood
test.14 The hospital staff, finding no medical reason to conduct a
blood test, contacted the York County District Attorney's Office to
determine whether a blood test should be conducted on Eisenhart,
given the initial consent and two subsequent refusals.' 5 Under di-
rection of the District Attorney, the hospital staff drew blood from
Eisenhart.' 6 The test results showed a blood alcohol level of
.293%.'
Eisenhart made a pre-trial motion to suppress the blood test re-
sults.' 8 The Common Pleas Court of York County denied the mo-
tion." A jury convicted Eisenhart of driving under the influence of
greater.
75 Pa Cons Stat Ann §3731(a)(4).
6. Eisenhart, 611 A2d at 682.
7. Id at 681.
8. Id at 681-82.
9. Id at 682.
10. Id.





16. Id. The court noted that no grounds exist for a District Attorney to take part in a
medical decision. Therefore, the hospital staff drew the blood as an agent for the common-
wealth. The superior court erred in characterizing the blood test as one conducted for medi-
cal purposes. Id at 684 n 5.





alcohol, and driving with a blood alcohol level in excess of .10%.20
Eisenhart made a post-trial motion for a new trial on grounds that
the admission into evidence of the blood test results was im-
proper.21 The motion was denied by the Common Pleas Court of
York County.2 2
Eisenhart appealed the conviction to the superior court on
grounds that the blood test was conducted in violation of his right
to refuse the test under the Implied Consent provision of the
Pennsylvania statutes,23 and that the trial court erred when it de-
nied his motion to suppress the blood test results.24 The superior
court determined that Eisenhart initially consented to the blood
test,25 and notwithstanding the two subsequent refusals, had im-
pliedly consented to the blood test.26 The superior court affirmed
the decision of the trial court not to suppress from evidence the
blood test results.
27
Eisenhart appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.2 8 The
first issue Eisenhart raised on appeal was whether a driver charged
with DUI and driving with a blood alcohol level in excess of .10%
had the right to refuse a blood test.29 If the court found in the
affirmative, Eisenhart then raised the issue of whether blood test
results obtained in violation of the right were admissible as evi-
20. Id.
21. Id at 683.
22. Id.
23. Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547(b) (Purdon Supp 1992). This statute provides:
Chemical testing to determine amount of alcohol or controlled substance:
(b) Suspension for refusal -
(1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of Section 3731 (relating to
driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is requested to sub-
mit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted
but upon notice by the police officer, the department shall suspend the operat-
ing privilege of the person for a period of 12 months.
(2) It shall be the duty of the police officer to inform the person that the per-
son's operating privilege will be suspended upon refusal to submit to chemical
testing.
(3) Any person whose operating privilege is suspended under the provisions of
this section shall have the same right to appeal as provided for in cases of
suspension for other reasons.
75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547(b). See notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text for relevant
statutory provisions of section 3731.
24. Eisenhart, 611 A2d at 682.
25. Id.
26. Id. The superior court provided no rationale for their holding that Eisenhart im-
pliedly consented to the blood test. Id.
27. Id at 683.
28. Id at 682.
29. Id at 683.
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dence of statutory violations. 0
Chief Justice Nix delivered the opinion of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court.3' To determine rights of a party under the Implied
Consent provision of the Vehicle Code, the court relied on the ex-
press language of section 1547 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.
Generally, the statute provides that consent of a party to testing is
implied until it is affirmatively revoked. 2 This reasoning was
based upon the interplay between subsections (a) and (b) of sec-
tion 1547."3 Subsection (a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny
person who drives, operates or is in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to have
given consent to one or more chemical tests of the breath, blood or
urine . . .'. Subsection (b) of section 1547 provides, in part, that
" [i]f any person . . . is requested to submit to chemical testing
and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon
notice by the police officer, the department shall suspend the oper-
ating privilege of the person for a period of 12 months. '3 5
It is apparent that the chemical testing referred to in subsection
(b) is that testing set forth in subsection (a). As noted above, the
interplay between the subsections is evident because the statute
provides a penalty for a party who refuses to submit to chemical
testing. The penalty serves as an inducement for the party to con-
sent. 6 Refusal to submit to chemical testing results in a suspen-
sion of the party's operating privilege for a period of 12 months.3 7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the lower courts'
holdings that Eisenhart's original consent to the blood test pre-
30. Id at 684. The court did not rule on the other issues raised in Eisenhart's appeal.
Eisenhart argued that to the extent the court did not hold that a driver has the right to
refuse a blood test and that blood test results obtained in violation of the asserted right are
inadmissible as evidence, that the provisions of the statute violate the Constitutions of the
United States and Pennsylvania. Id at 682. Because the court held in favor of Eisenhart on
statutory grounds, the court refused to address the constitutional issues. Id at 684 n 6.
31. Id at 681. The opinion of the court was unanimous in result; however, Justice
Flaherty filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Papadakos and Cappy joined. Id at
685.
32. Id at 683.
33. See notes 2 and 23 and accompanying text for relevant statutory provisions.
34. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547(a) (Purdon Supp 1992). See note 2 and accompany-
ing text for relevant statutory provisions.
35. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547(b) (Purdon Supp 1992). See note 23 and accompany-
ing text for relevant statutory provisions.
36. Eisenhart, 611 A2d at 683-84.
37. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547(b) (Purdon Supp 1992). See note 23 and accompany-
ing text for relevant statutory provisions.
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cluded him from ,changing his mind.38 Pursuant to the Implied
Consent provision of the Vehicle Code, a party has an absolute
right to refuse to submit to blood testing. 9 Such a right must be
acknowledged and honored.40
The court was then required to determine the second issue
raised by Eisenhart, whether suppression from evidence of the
blood test results was an appropriate remedy?41 To make this de-
termination, the Justices relied on their opinion in Commonwealth
v Tarbert.2
In Tarbert, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that
conducting police roadblocks violated Pennsylvania statutes, al-
though they were not violative of the Constitutions of both the
United States and Pennsylvania. In Tarbert, evidence gathered
from the unlawful roadblocks was used at the trial court level to
support charges of driving with a blood alcohol level in excess of
.10% 44 The supreme court ruled that suppression of the blood test
results from evidence was the proper remedy for evidence obtained
from acts that violated Pennsylvania statutes.45 The facts in
Eisenhart are analogous to those in Tarbert; evidence to support
charges of driving with a blood alcohol level in excess of .10% was
gathered from acts that violated the Pennsylvania statutes. There-
fore, the court concluded that the holding in Eisenhart must be
consistent with the holding in Tarbert with respect to admission of
the blood test results into evidence.48
38. Eisenhart, 611 A2d at 683. Justice Nix mentioned, without discussion, that the
issues of testing of an unconscious driver, Commonwealth v Danforth, 395 Pa Super 1, 576
A2d 1013 (1990), appeal granted, 526 Pa 647, 585 A2d 467 (1990), and a driver whose blood
was drawn for medical purposes, Commonwealth v Kohl, 395 Pa Super 73, 576 A2d 1049
(1990), appeal granted, 526 Pa 630, 584 A2d 313 (1990), are pending before the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court. Id at 684.
39. Eisenhart, 611 A2d at 683.
40. Id.
41. Id at 684.
42. 517 Pa 277, 535 A2d 1035 (1987).
43. Tarbert, 535 A2d at 1045. In Tarbert, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
police roadblocks violate § 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code. Id at 1044.
44. Id at 1036.
45. Id at 1045. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Tarbert, regarding ad-
mission of test results into evidence, was distinguished from superior court decisions that
upheld admission of chemical test results in situations where: 1) the driver consented, Com-
monwealth v Leib, 403 Pa Super 223, 588 A2d 922 (1991), appeal denied 528 Pa 692, 600
A2d 194 (1991); 2) the hospital drew blood for medical testing, Commonwealth v Hipp, 380
Pa Super 345, 551 A2d 1086 (1988); and 3) the driver consented to a breathalyzer after
refusing, Commonwealth v Wege, 368 Pa Super 181, 533 A2d 776 (1987), appeal denied 519
Pa 665, 548 A2d 255 (1988). Eisenhart, 611 A2d at 689.
46. Eisenhart, 611 A2d at 684-85.
1993
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In Eisenhart, the court stated that not all evidence illegally ob-
tained must be suppressed. In certain circumstances, improperly
admitted evidence could be deemed harmless to the outcome
when:
(1] that the evidence of guilt, without regard to the tainted evidence, is so
overwhelming that conviction would have followed beyond a reasonable
doubt without regard to it, [2] that the tainted evidence was merely cumu-
lative to other proper persuasive evidence on the issue for which it is of-
fered, or [3] that it is so slight or tangential in its effect that its influence
can be determined to be de minimis [sic]."'
The court found that none of the aforementioned exceptions ap-
plied to this case. In fact, the evidence was key to the common-
wealth's case against Eisenhart.4
8
The convictions for DUI and driving with a blood alcohol level
in excess of .10% were reversed because "the blood test results had
greater than a de minimis [sic] effect on the jury, that the results
were not merely cumulative, and that it is not beyond a reasonable
doubt that the other evidence presented was so overwhelming to
erase any doubt of a conviction ... and thus played a key role in
the Commonwealth's prosecution.' 9 Eisenhart's sentence was va-
cated, and the case remanded for a new trial.50
Justice Flaherty filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices
Papadakos and Cappy joined." The concurrence was necessary be-
cause the Justices agreed with the majority's reasoning and conclu-
sion in Eisenhart; however, they disagreed with Eisenhart's inter-
pretation of the holding in Tarbert. Justice Flaherty believed that
the Tarbert decision found that suppression from evidence of
blood test results was necessary when the results were a product of
an act performed in violation of a state statute.5 2 Without explana-
tion, Justice Flaherty stated that the holding in Tarbert did not
determine that police roadblocks were constitutional."3
The Pennsylvania Legislature recognized the problem of com-
bining alcohol and driving as early as 1909. Driving while intoxi-
cated (DWI) was made an offense of the Vehicle Code in 1909." In
47. Commonwealth v Norris, 498 Pa 308, 317, 446 A2d 246, 250 (1982) citing Com-
monwealth v Story, 476 Pa 391, 383 A2d 155 (1978). Eisenhart, 611 A2d at 685.
48. Eisenhart, 611 A2d at 685.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id (Justice Flaherty concurring).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Act No 174, Pub L No 267, Laws of Pennsylvania (1909), repealed by Act No 283,
676 Vol. 31:671
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1919, the offense was redefined to include driving under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor and controlled substances."5 The Vehi-
cle Code was overhauled in 1959, and consolidated with the Trac-
tor Code and Motor Vehicle Responsibility Act.56 Driving under
the influence of liquor or drugs remained an offense. In 1961, an
amendment to the Vehicle Code added a new section authorizing
the use of chemical tests to determine intoxication.58 This section
provided for chemical testing of the breath of persons suspected of
driving under the influence of alcohol.59 Chemical testing of the
breath was permitted only with consent of the driver60 and the test
results were admissible as evidence of DWI."
Section 624.1 was amended on December 22, 1969, and became
known as the Implied Consent provision.6 2 The Pennsylvania Leg-
Pub L No 678, Laws of Pennsylvania (1919). This section provided: No person when intoxi-
cated, shall operate a motor-vehicle, and any person guilty of doing so shall be subject to a
fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100), nor more than three hundred dollars
($300), or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both; and the license of any person
guilty of a violation of this section may be suspended for six months by the Highway Com-
missioner. Act No 174, Pub L No 267.
55. Act No 283, Pub L No 678, Laws of Pennsylvania (1919), repealed by Act No 32,
Pub L No 58, Laws of Pennsylvania (1959). This section provided: No person shall operate a
motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any narcotic or habit producing
drug, or permit any person who may be under the influence of intoxication liquor or narcotic
drugs to operate any motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control. Act No 283,
Pub L No 678.
56. Act No 32, Pub L No 58, Laws of Pennsylvania (1959), repealed by Act No 81,
Pub L No 162, Laws of Pennsylvania (1976).
57. Id. Act No 32, Pub L No 58, Laws of Pennsylvania (1959), codified at 75 Pa Stat
§ 1037 (Purdon 1959), repealed by Act No 81, Pub L No 162, Laws of Pennsylvania (1976),
codified at 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731 (Purdon 1977). The provision is substantially un-
changed from the 1919 Act. See note 55 and accompanying text.
58. 75 Pa Stat § 624.1 (Purdon 1961), repealed by Act No 81, Pub L No 162, Laws of




62. 75 Pa Stat § 624.1 (Purdon 1969), repealed by Act No 81, Pub L No 162, Laws of
Pennsylvania (1976), codified at 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547 (Purdon 1977). Section 624.1
provides: Intoxication Chemical Tests, etc.-
(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle or tractor in the Commonwealth shall
be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of his breath, for the purpose
of determining the alcoholic content of his blood: Provided, that the test is adminis-
tered by qualified personnel and with equipment approved by the secretary at the
discretion of the police officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to
have been driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Qualified person-
nel means a physician or a police officer who has received training in the use of such
equipment in a training program approved by the secretary. If any person is placed
under arrest and charged with the operation of a motor vehicle or tractor while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor and is thereafter requested to submit to chemical
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 31:671
islature amended this provision in response to federal standards
that required states to establish programs to reduce the number of
alcohol related motor vehicle accidents.6" The federal standards re-
quired that the states enact implied consent laws."
As promulgated, section 624.1(a) provided implied consent to a
chemical test of the breath.65 In addition, section 624.1(a) stated
that if a person refused to take the chemical test, the test shall not
be conducted.6 Chemical testing of the blood, in persons not able
to supply enough breath for a breathalyzer, 7 was provided for in
subsection (f) of the Implied Consent provision. Subsection (f) also
provided for admission into evidence of the results of a blood test
of a person unable to take a breathalyzer6s As noted above, sub-
section (a) provided for chemical testing of the breath only.e In
test and refuses to do so, the test shall not be given but the secretary may suspend
his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle or tractor with or without a hearing.
Any person whose license or permit to operate a motor vehicle or tractor is suspended
under the provisions of this act shall have the same right to appeal as provided in
cases of suspension for other reasons.
(b) In any summary proceeding or criminal proceeding in which the defendant is
charged with driving a motor vehicle or tractor while under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor, the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood, as shown by a chemical
test of his breath, his blood, or his urine, which analysis was conducted on equipment
approved by the secretary and operated by qualified personnel, shall be admissible as
evidence ...
(f) If for any reason a person is physically unable to supply enough breath to com-
plete a chemical test a physician or a technician acting under his direction may with-
draw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein. Consent is
hereby given by such persons. The chemical analysis of the blood taken under these
circumstances shall be admissible in evidence.
75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 624.1. With this statutory change also came a change in reference of
the offence from driving while intoxicated ("DWI") to driving under the influence ("DUI).
63. Comment, The Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law: Problems Arising In A
Criminal Proceeding, 74 Dickinson L Rev 219 (1969-70). The Secretary of Transportation
issued standards on June 26, 1967 that required states to: 1) strengthen their drunk driving
laws, 2) include implied consent in the laws, and 3) implement a tracking system to deter-
mine the extent that alcohol is related to drivers and adult pedestrians involved in fatal
motor vehicle accidents. Comment, 74 Dickinson L Rev at 219 n 5.
64. Id (cited in note 63).
65. 75 Pa Stat § 624.1(a) (Purdon 1969), repealed by Act No 81, Pub L No 162, Laws
of Pennsylvania (1976), codified at 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547 (Purdon 1977). See note 62
and accompanying text for relevant statutory provisions.
66. 75 Pa Stat § 624.1(a) (Purdon 1969) (emphasis added).
67. 75 Pa Stat § 624.1(f) (Purdon 1969), repealed by Act No 81, Pub L No 162, Laws
of Pennsylvania (1976), codified at 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547 (Purdon 1977). See note 62
and accompanying text for relevant statutory provisions.
68. 75 Pa Stat § 624.1(f) (Purdon 1969).
69. 75 Pa Stat § 624.1(a) (Purdon 1969), repealed by Act No 81, Pub L No 162, Laws
of Pennsylvania (1976), codified at 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547 (Purdon 1977). See note 62
and accompanying text for relevant statutory provisions.
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addition, subsection (a) expressly provided that when a person re-
quested to submit to a chemical test refused to submit, the test
shall not be conducted. 0 Subsection (f) did not expressly provide
for refusal of a person to submit to the chemical test.71 Inasmuch
as subsection (a) dealt with breath testing and expressly provided
for refusal to submit to the testing, and subsection (f) dealt with
testing of the blood but did not provide for refusal to submit to the
testing, the courts were required to determine what action was to
be taken when a person requested to submit to blood testing re-
fused to submit to such testing. The Pennsylvania Superior Court
answered this question using statutory interpretation.
In Commonwealth v Wolpert, 2 the appellant was involved in a
motor vehicle accident. Police requested the driver to submit to a
blood test because he was unable to take a breathalyzer as the re-
sult of an injury to his chin.73 Appellant refused the blood test but
blood was drawn by the hospital under direction of the police.7 4
The trial court failed to suppress the blood test results from evi-
dence.7 5 The superior court had two issues to resolve. The first is-
sue was whether appellant had a statutory right to refuse the blood
test when the right to refuse a breath test was specifically provided
by statute.7 If the appellant had a right to refuse, was suppression
of blood test results from evidence an appropriate remedy for vio-
lation of his right to refuse.7 The superior court found that the
appellant had a statutory right to refuse the blood test because the
statutory scheme of section 624.1 resulted in the reasonable con-
clusion that all of the paragraphs should be read together, there-
fore the right to refuse a chemical test applied to the blood test
provided for in section 624.1(f)/ .To determine whether the driver
had a statutory right to refuse the blood test, the court relied on
the express language of the statutory scheme of section 624.1.71
The court concluded that all subsections subsequent to subsection
70. 75 Pa Stat § 624.1(a) (Purdon 1969).
71. 75 Pa Stat § 624.1(0 (Purdon 1969), repealed by Act No 81, Pub L No 162, Laws
of Pennsylvania (1976), codified at 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547 (Purdon 1977). See note 62
and accompanying text for relevant statutory provisions.
72. 224 Pa Super 361, 308 A2d 120 (1973).
73. Wolpert, 308 A2d 120 at 121.
74. Id.
75. Id at 126.
76. Id at 125.
77. Id at 126.
78. Id at 125.
79. Id.
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 31:671
(a) referred back to subsection (a), or incorporated the provisions
of the subsection.8" Also, because the reasonable grounds language
that permitted an officer to request a test was embodied in subsec-
tion (a), and the numerical blood alcohol content percentages that
were included in subsection (c) were necessary to understand sub-
section (f), the only reasonable conclusion was that the legislature
intended for all subsections of section 624.1 to be read together. 81
Therefore, the right to refuse applied to chemical tests of the
blood.82 Pursuant to a holding in favor of Wolpert on the first is-
sue, the court held that blood test results obtained in contraven-
tion of the right to refuse were inadmissible as evidence of the DUI
because the blood test was conducted in violation of appellant's
statutory right to refuse the test.83
The Vehicle Code was substantially rewritten in 1977;8" however,
the change affecting section 624.1 was more form than substance. 85
The Implied Consent provision was renamed as "Chemical test to
determine amount of alcohol", and was recodified at section 1547.88
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id at 126.
83. Id.
84. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1501 et seq (Purdon 1977).
85. See note 87 and accompanying text for relevant statutory provisions.
86. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547 (Purdon 1977). This statute provides:
Chemical test to determine amount of alcohol:
(a) General rule. - Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this Commonwealth
shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test of breath or blood for pur-
pose of determining the alcoholic content of blood if a police officer shall have reason-
able grounds to believe the person to have been driving a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol. The test shall be administered by qualified personnel and
with equipment approved by the department. Qualified personnel means a physician
or a technician acting under the physician's direction or a police officer who has ful-
filled training requirements in the use of such equipment in a training program ap-
proved by the department.
(b) Suspension or refusal. -
(1) If any person placed under arrest for driving under the influence of alco-
hol is requested to submit to a chemical test and refuses to do so, the test shall
not be given but upon notice by the police officer, the department shall:
(i) suspend the operating privilege of the person for a period of six
months; or
(ii) revoke the operating privilege of the person for a period of one
year for a second or subsequent refusal within a period of three
years.
(2) It shall be the duty of the police officer to inform the person that the
person's operating privilege will be suspended or revoked upon refusal to sub-
mit to a chemical test. -
(3) Any person whose operating privilege is suspended under the provisions
of this section shall have the same right of appeal as provided for in cases of
680
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The statute provided, among others: 1) for implied consent for
chemical testing of the breath and blood;8" 2) for suspension of the
operating privilege of persons who refused to submit to a chemical
test;88 and 3) that results of the chemical test were admissible into
evidence.8
Sweeping revisions of the Vehicle Code occurred in 1982, in re-
sponse to a dramatic increase in DUI related fatalities.9 0 The 1982
amendment to section 1547 added a testing provision for con-
trolled substances in addition to chemical testing for the presence
of alcohol.9 Pursuant to the revised section 1547, the courts still
recognized a statutory right to refuse a chemical test. Such a con-
clusion was apparent in the opinions of Commonwealth v Hipp92
and Commonwealth v Molino.s
In Hipp, the appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident
and was transported to the hospital where blood was drawn for
medical purposes.9 4 The tests performed for medical purposes in-
cluded a test to determine blood alcohol content.9 5 Police arrived
at the hospital after the medically necessary blood test was taken,
and requested that Hipp submit to a blood test to determine the
alcohol content of his blood. 6 Hipp refused the blood test.9 7 The
suspension or revocation for other reasons.
(c) Test results admissible in evidence.- In any summary proceeding or criminal
proceeding in which the defendant is charged with driving a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood, as
shown by a chemical analysis of his breath or blood, which analysis was conducted
with equipment of a type approved by the department of Health and operated by
qualified personnel, shall be admissible in evidence.
75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547.
87. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547(a) (Purdon 1977). See note 87 and accompanying
text for relevant statutory provisions.
88. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547(b) (Purdon 1977). See note 87 and accompanying
text for relevant statutory provisions.
89. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547(c) (Purdon 1977). See note 87 and accompanying
text for relevant statutory provisions.
90. Comment, The New Pennsylvania Drunk Driving Law: Last Call for the One-
For-The-Road Era, 87 Dickinson L Rev 805 (1982-83). Alcohol related fatalities increased
one hundred fifty-four percent between 1972 and 1981. Comment, 87 Dickinson L Rev at
805 citing Governor's DUI Task Force Report at 1.
91. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547 (Purdon Supp 1992). See notes 2 and 23 and accom-
panying text for relevant statutory provisions.
92. 380 Pa Super 345, 551 A2d 1086 (1988).
93. 406 Pa Super 66, 593 A2d 872 (1991), appeal granted, Pa , 600 A2d 535
(1991), rev'd Pa , 608 A2d 493 (1992).
94. Hipp, 551 A2d at 1087.
95. Id.
96. Id at 1088.
97. Id.
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superior court was required to determine if blood test results ob-
tained for medical purposes prior to police request for the test and
which were subpoenaed by police, were admissible as evidence of
DUI when the party refused to submit to a blood test at police
request.2 In its analysis of this issue, the superior court stated that
a party had the statutory right to refuse chemical testing, and
upon exercise of that right, the test should not be conducted. 9
This point was not analyzed further.
In Molino, the appellee was arrested for DUI and transported to
a DUI processing center where he was requested to submit to a
blood test.10 Molino refused the blood test.101 Although he re-
fused, Molino's arm was forcibly restrained by two police officers
while a nurse withdrew the blood.0 2 The court relied on the ex-
press language of the statute and relevant findings of fact by the
trial court and held that the blood test was a clear: violation of
Molino's rights under the provisions of section 1547.103
Until recently, controversy existed regarding whether the blood
test results obtained in contravention of a person's statutory right
to refuse chemical testing were admissible as evidence of DUI pro-
vided the test did not violate the person's constitutional rights.'0 4
In Tarbert, motorists were arrested for DUI after being stopped at
police roadblocks commonly known as sobriety check points.'06
Upon determining that sobriety check points did not violate the
Pennsylvania Constitution,' the supreme court concluded that
sobriety check points were unlawful because they violated the stat-
utory parameters of the Pennsylvania statutes. 0 7 The court stated,
without reasoning, that the results of the test should be suppressed
when obtained from a constitutional, but unlawful search. 0 8
In Molino, the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed whether
suppression of the blood test results was the appropriate remedy
when the results were obtained in contravention of the statutory
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right to refuse chemical testing.10 In its analysis, the superior
court relied on a line of case law that held that a party did not
have a constitutional right to refuse to submit to blood testing.110
The court concluded that although a driver had a statutory right
to refuse, suppression of blood test results obtained in contraven-
tion of that right was inappropriate because the party had no con-
stitutional right to refuse.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
versed the superior court's holding in a per curiam" 2 opinion filed
on June 18, 1992.113 In Molino, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
relied on its rationale in Commonwealth v Eisenhart."
In Eisenhart, the defendant initially consented to chemical test-
ing of the blood for presence of alcohol, but prior to the testing, he
verbally expressed his refusal to submit to the test."' Drawing
blood for the sole purpose of determining the presence of alcohol
or controlled substances violated the Implied Consent provision
once Eisenhart refused to take the test.
The Implied Consent provision stated, in part, that "... [i]f any
person . . . is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses
to do so, the testing shall not be conducted.""' 6 The language of
the statute was clear. When a person refuses to take a chemical
test, the test cannot be lawfully conducted.
Had the Commonwealth honored Eisenhart's right to refuse the
blood test, the test would not have been conducted. Had the test
not been conducted, no test results would have been available to
submit to the jury as evidence of DUI or driving with a blood alco-
hol level in excess of .10%. Suppression of the test results from
evidence would have achieved the same result; no test results
would have been submitted to the jury as evidence of DUI or driv-
ing with a blood alcohol level in excess of .10%. Whereas the court
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determined that the blood test results were key to the Common-
wealth's case against Eisenhart, '1 7 suppression of the test results
was the appropriate remedy for violation of his statutory right.
Drivers on Pennsylvania roadways should not be mislead by the
holding in Eisenhart. Although the absence of blood test results
may make it more difficult for the Commonwealth to meet its bur-
den of proof, refusing to submit to chemical testing of the blood
for the presence of alcohol or controlled substances will not ease
the pain of the defendant for being charged for DUI or driving
with a blood alcohol level in excess of .10%. In addition to other
admissible evidence, the Implied Consent provision permits the
Commonwealth to introduce into evidence at the criminal proceed-
ing, the fact that the defendant refused to submit to chemical test-
ing as required by the Implied Consent provision.1 8 The jury can-
not use the refusal as a presumption of guilt, but it may consider it
in light of other evidence of the charges.11 9 Also, the individual's
operating privilege will be suspended for 12 months for refusing to
submit to chemical testing."'
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